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BOOK REVIEWS
Word Politics: Verbal Strategy Among the Superpowers. THOMAS M.
FRANCK and FDWARD WMSBAND. New York: Oxford University
Press. 1971. Pp. xiii, 176. $5.95.
How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy. Louis HFNKIN. New
York: Praeger Press. 1968. Pp. xii, 324. $3.50.
For at least a generation the American study of international
politics has been dominated by self-styled realists who believe, as Hans
Morgenthau does, that policy makers must choose "prudence" over
principle and recognize that world opinion and law are mere facades
behind which states invariably act to extend, maintain, or demonstrate
their power. The two books here under discussion in very different
ways offer articulate and occasionally passionate counter-arguments to
such an analysis. Significantly, Thomas M. Franck and Louis Henkin
are lawyers with both practical knowledge of how states make policy and
definite views as to how legal advice may be vital in times of international crisis. It is important to all three authors, as it should be to
all concerned citizens, to rebut the realist corollary that law is, at most,
accidental to international politics.
I
In Word Politics Franck and Edward Weisband argue that states
must transcend narrow formulations of their immediate advantages in
a particular course of action. They avoid the word "law" and in what
is often an angry indictment of diplomatic myopia assert both that a
state must "listen to itself as if it were the enemy speaking,"' and that
"an amorally conceived foreign policy, at least for the United States,
is likely.., to be unsuccessful by the standards of 'hard' strategy and
national-interest cost/benefit accounting."12 One way the United States
might deter Soviet aggression is to sheath its own sword. It might also
guard its tongue. The authors use two invasions (of the Dominican
Republic in 1965 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968) as examples of what
happens when force and rhetoric get the most of us.
In both instances one superpower invaded a satellite while the
1 T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, WORD POLITICS: VERBAL STRATEGY AMONG THE SUPERPowEs 8 (1971).
2 Id. at viii-ix.
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other inveighed but did not act against a blatant violation of international law. The invasions produced nearly identical doctrines by
which the superpowers claimed the right to stifle political change within
their surrounding communities. President Johnson proclaimed the
right of the Organization of American States (which the United States
then dominated) to contrive a multilateral force to prevent the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere. 3 Those who would use internal or external force to implant
Communism in our sphere of influence were forewarned that the
United States would counter with its own force. Similarly, Leonid
Brezhnev rationalized the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia with the
following "principles": no state within the Soviet orbit could unilaterally withdraw from regional or ideological obligations; the Socialist
community (dominated by the Soviet Union) has the right to impose
standards of behavior within that orbit, and force, if necessary, would
be used to maintain such standards. 4
Franck and Weisband contend that American justification of its
use of force in 1965 made the Soviet action not only less heinous but
also more probable. In effect, American objections in 1968 were "estopped" by our previous deeds and words. An "echo phenomenon"
operated by which unnecessarily broad American language could be
used by the Soviets. The two crises and the reactions of the invaded
nations were "as symmetrical as a classical ballet, with the two powers
in the second movement neatly changing roles and dancing each other's
steps." 5

If world order is worth attaining, great powers must avoid careless
and unnecessary bullying of lesser states within their spheres. The
authors point out that the Johnson doctrine arguably protects our
national interests by excluding Communism from the hemisphere,
stabilizes the entire world system by providing hard boundaries between "theirs" and "ours," maintains a polar balance against an adversary many believe is not prepared to loosen its grip over its satellites,
and possibly deters small states from causing trouble for larger ones. 6
The costs of pursuing this policy, however, may be far greater than
the benefits. Bloc politics does not necessarily connote international
stability or the diminution of tension. Maintaining spheres of influence
3 Statement by President Johnson, May 2, 1965, in 52 U.S. DEm'T OF STATE

BuLL. 745

(1965).
4 See Sovereignty and International Duties of Socialist Countries, Pravda, Sept. 25,
1968, reprinted in translation, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1968, at 3, col. 1.
5 T. FRNlcn & E. WEISBAND, supra note 1, at 97.
6 Id. at 114-15.
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is expensive economically, militarily, and in terms of prestige and good
will; emulating the Soviet Union can prove disastrous for our own
self-image and the images others have of us. In addition, "[i]t is far
more likely that Russia can persist with a Brezhnev Doctrine than that
the United States will persevere with the Johnson Doctrine." 7 By the
peculiar pendulum of American politics intervention leads to isolation
and isolation to neglect which, in turn, contributes to later crises.
Word Politics is, on the whole, a skillful attempt to deal with this
dilemma. Borrowing concepts from law and strategic studies (especially
non-zero-sum gaming and reciprocity8 ), Franck and Weisband spin an
argument which is not novel to lawyers: take care how you write your
contracts. What they call the "rules of the new strategy" depend upon
the ways superpowers act and speak to each other.
In this new world, the two superpowers do not simply "cancel each
other out." They create a wholly new condition of strategic interaction in which the role of force is still enormous even though it
is immobilized, but in which new nonmilitary concepts-mutually
shared expectations, images, climate, signals, patterns of behavior,
and reciprocity-take on new strategic significance. It is in the
management of these added factors that one superpower has an
opportunity not to defeat but to outgain the other through skillful
verbal strategy.9
Only by reassessing revolutionary change within its own region and
accepting "mutual accommodation" in dealing with such changes-as
the Soviet Union did vis-4-vis Finland and Austria-can American
strategic interests and images coincide. The Nixon administration's
low-key reaction to the Allend6 government in Chile is perhaps one
hopeful sign.
Word Politics should be read by lawyers and statesmen concerned
with the ways utterances and precedents affect world order. This is
not to say that the book is flawless. Franck and Weisband write as if
world politics resulted primarily from polar antipathies between Soviet
and American fortresses. Yet in nearly every way polarity is lessening
and, accordingly, instances of unilateral intervention into spheres of
influence will diminish. There is growing evidence which indicates
the contemporary distaste of the superpowers for confrontation: the
tolerance of the superpowers regarding the independent foreign policies
of Chile, Peru, and even Rumania; the confusing patterns of alliances
manifested in the United Nations, partly as the result of mainland
Id. at 116.
8 See generally T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1963).
0 T. FRANCK & E. WIsBAND, supra note 1, at 120.
7
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China's emergence as a permanent member of the Security Council;
the tragic nonideological conflicts between lesser powers and the inability of the superpowers to deter them. Confronted by isolationism
at home and competition abroad the two superpowers seem increasingly
willing to avoid intervention as a tool of diplomacy.
Franck and Weisband claim that words are more significant than
actions. They seem to be saying that the gravest flaw in our Dominican
adventure was not the invasion itself but the unnecessarily broad language used to defend it. Although the point is useful-words used as
rationalization do affect future expectations-this may appear to many
readers as overstatement if not sophistry. If suspicion of complicity was
created by the American invasion of the Dominican Republic, it arose
primarily from the deed itself rather than after-the-fact rationales.
Similarly, the authors' prescription-"any action by the United States
which cannot be credibly set out in terms that build and strengthen
a conceptual framework for the kind of reciprocally principled world
we want, can never be in our national interest"10-is two parts wishful
thinking and one part na'vet,. If aggression sets precedents it might
equally be argued that brinksmanship is the best way to play the
game.11 Those who think otherwise should expect Franck and Weisband to anticipate and rebut this reductio ad absurdum.
II
How Nations Behave broadly defines the situations in which law
is a necessary component of foreign policy. Henkin's analysis considers
the ways accepted rules already influence policy making. The book
is especially valuable in accounting for the occasions when law does
not work-when statesmen consider the costs and benefits of pursuing
lawful behavior and decide that circumstances require lawlessness.
Readers should beware that this book is often slow-paced and
even pedestrian in its treatment of the role of law in the cold war. Indeed, for the first 200 pages or so one gets a competent but tedious
account of how law has been used in international crises. Law, in this
context, means "a sense of obligation, and a sense of violation when it
fails."1 2 Lacking the political instruments necessary for a fully predictable and enforceable law, international society muddles through
on the fragile basis of this sense of obligation. As Henkin indicates,
10 Id. at ix.
11 See, e.g., J. PAYNE, THE AMERICAN THREAT (1970).
12 L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 15

(1968).
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"the lawfulness of an action" depends upon "whether a hypothetical
impartial international tribunal would conclude that particular behavior violated some international rule, standard, or undertaking."' 3
States do, at times, sacrifice immediate advantages for the sake of
(1) establishing a general principle, (2) creating reasonable expectations,
or (3) avoiding criticism or retaliation. In some cases, of course, these
may be insufficient reasons under the realist view for acting lawfully:
in situations, for example, when territory or security can be gained
quickly, when interpretations of what is lawful are ambiguous or
culture-laden, or when domestic pressures require "nationalist" solutions. Henkin suggests, perhaps too ingenuously, that states, like common criminals, calculate the probability of being punished.14
On the whole, Henkin plays down the significance of twentieth
century developments. He contends that
technology has been generally a stabilizing influence, in support of
the norm of international law which forbids the unilateral use of
force. Ideological conflict, on the other hand, has increased instability, threatened the foundations of international law, reduced
its content, and weakened its observance. 15
Perhaps the most volatile development of all is the increase in the
number of sovereign states. The rise of new states makes more difficult
the creation of law presumably based on unanimity, generates new
issues, stimulates competition for affection between the East and West,
and encourages regional rather than universal perspectives of what the
law is and what it should be.
Analysis of three cases constitutes one of the longest, and to some
extent most gratuitous, sections of the book.1 The use of law to settle
the tripartite invasion of Egypt in 1956 (in which according to Henkin
the law against unilateral use of force was violated but vindicated),
Israel's participation in the abduction and trial of Adolf Eichmann
(in which the law failed), and the American "quarantine" of Cuba in
1962 (in which America, by Henkin's standards, demonstrated restraint
in avoiding such broad doctrines as "anticipatory self-defense") are well
worth reading but poorly choosen examples of the law at work. For a
more comprehensive view of how the law affects international crises this
book should be complemented with modern casebooks on the subject."7
Id. at 37.
Id. at 50, 89.
Id. at 104-05.
Id. at 186-242.
17 E.g., L. SCHEINMAN & D. WILKINSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICAL CRISIS:
13
14
15
16

AN ANALYric CASmEoOK (1968).
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Henkin notes (much as did Franck and Weisband) that
[e]vents in international relations, like cases in law, have a life of
their own. They are available as possible precedent beyond their
original facts, context, or justification in doctrine. Responsible nations, in their own behavior or in reacting to the behavior of others,
avoid hardened categories and deal imaginatively with precedents
with due concern for their impact on international law.' 8
Henkin concludes his effort soberly but optimistically by taking issue
with the so-called realists who claim that "the most serious fault of our
past policy formulation" lies "in something that I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems."' 9 George Kennan,
a realist who uttered those remarks, complained that the "law is too
abstract, too inflexible, too hard to adjust to the demands of the unpredictable and the unexpected," and that the possibility that violations
will be punished should never be assumed. 20 Hans Morgenthau is also
cited for the proposition that "the legalistic approach to essentially
political problems is but an aberration from the true law of politics." 2' 1
Henkin counters: first, to both Kennan and Morgenthau the law seems
to be exclusively hard and fast decisions, a clear and perhaps purposeful misinterpretation; second, that "realists" who try to monopolize the
term "national interest" should recognize that if the term has any be22
havioral meaning it must encompass observance of law.

By focusing on today's (or at least yesterday's) issues, and by relating international law to them, Henkin builds a persuasive case that
law is effective in international society. He does not, however, look
at many of the currently controversial areas of the law such as the law
of the seas and the law of expropriation of foreign holdings. Thus
his focus on the law's condemnation of unilateral force (like Franck
and Weisband's) cannot be taken as all there is to be said about how
nations behave subject to law.
III

It is encouraging to find two such different yet compatible books
concerning the relevance of law to war and peace issues. Narrow and
even incorrect interpretations of "law" have been used by all kinds of
rogues to justify the most heinous of actions. Both of these books,
18

L. -INuu, supra note 12, at 240.

19 Id. at 254, quoting G. KENNAN, AMEpICAN DpmOMAcy, 1900-1950, at 95 (1951).
20 Id. at 255, quoting G. KENNAN, supra note 19, at 98-99.

21 Id. at 261, quoting Morgenthau, Diplomacy, 55
22 Id. at 258-66.

YALE

L.J. 1067, 1078 (1946).
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starting with different premises and ending with different conclusions,
combine rational and legal approaches to world politics. The message
in both seems to be that more careful adherence to legal principles is
not only just but wise. Failure of American statesmen to honor the
spirit of law among nations has cheapened international society without
benefiting national interests.
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